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INTRODUCTION-LAND USE AND ZONING: ILLINOIS'
LASALLE NATIONAL BANK CRITERIA AND
MUNICIPAL CONSTITUTIONAL LIABILITY
By RICHARD L. ROBBINS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Neighborhoods change. Development resolutely pushes out be-
yond urbanized areas to envelop farmlands, earlier subdivisions and
unused open space. New uses for land suddenly arise-the motel was
once one such use. Now the fast food stand, the video arcade, the half-
way house, the undesired sign, the expanding church and the adult
bookstore vie for credits as undesired uses. Even the urbanized area is
affected. The shopping center expands beyond the four corners. Multi-
ple family housing replaces single family use. The gas station is turned
into an all night grocery.
The system we utilize to control and plan these changes is the zon-
ing system. The ability to use this system has rewarded some develop-
ers with profits and some communities with good planning, while in
other situations landowners have been hurt by inconsistent uses and
communities burdened with undesired development. From 1916, when
the first zoning ordinances began to spread across the country, until
today there has been remarkably little convergence that would provide
definition and boundaries for exercise of the zoning power. Conse-
quently, zoning litigation is only slightly less likely today than it was in
the early days. Further, zoning decisions may be extensively litigated
since the change in value to land can be significant-lawyers' fees and
court costs become affordable in even routine cases.
In addition, both potential litigants and the courts are aware of the
following major criticisms often aimed at the zoning system:'
-the zoning process has been called an "oriental bazaar" with un-
controlled wheeling and dealing;
-politics and pressure, more than land use planning, seem to ex-
* Mr. Robbins received his B.S. from Cornell University in 1961 and his J.D. from the
University of Pennsylvania in 1964. He is currently associated with the Chicago law firm of Ham-
man Bern & Miller and is the Program Director for Continuing Legal Education Technology,
Energy and Environment programs at IIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law.
I. VRANICAR, STREAMLINING LAND USE REGULATION 4-7 (1980), considers the problems
to be "wait and see" zoning, zoning used to discourage homebuilding, delays and complicated
rules for applications, and the turning of land use into a "lawyers' game".
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plain many zoning decisions, and growth cannot readily be con-
trolled nor the environment protected;
-the system is called unreliable, unpredictable and an uncertain
land use protector;
2
-the system reflects a nonprofessional approach stemming from its
administration by lay boards and commissions;
3
-- corruption and a perception of corruption undermines the public's
confidence in zoning;
-- overly protective zoning merely tends to provide a windfall to the
clever developer; and
-illegal actions seem routinely utilized by communities.
Unfortunately, these criticisms are not unfounded. One example
of a well known ploy is for a municipality opposing a land use such as
adult entertainment to pass an unconstitutional ordinance or deny a
permit without any constitutional basis. When a court finally reverses
the municipal action another ordinance is passed---one perhaps defec-
tive for other reasons. In this way the developer is weakened economi-
cally and loses any hope of obtaining appropriate permits. Developers,
too, have their ploys. Confronting underfinanced, developing rural
communities, some developers routinely threaten litigation if they do
not get their way. All too often, these communities cave in
immediately.
As a result of these problems, those opposing zoning have received
considerable impetus to litigate because a number of state and federal
courts have recently become more skeptical of the local zoning process.
Review has become more of a "hard look" than the presumption of
validity test usually utilized. As these courts have become more critical
of overly restrictive regulation or regulation without proper procedural
or application safeguards, a whole new set of constitutional rights
seems to have emerged.
Thus, federal constitutional law has expanded the concept of "tak-
ing." Monopolistic protection of certain land users at the expense of
competition in land use has been limited. Patterns of illegal practices
have made communities liable for damages. Neighbors and developers
have been granted new procedural rights.4 And new substantive bases
of protecting rights to free speech,. and establishing free exercise of
religion 6 and equal protection of the law7 have further limited local
2. URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, THIRTEEN PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATORY SIMPLIFICATION, 1
(1979).
3. Id.
4. Such rights include notice, open hearings, right of cross examination, and disclosure of
conflicts of interest. Some jurisdictions require findings of fact.
5. Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
6. Grendels Den, Inc. v. Goodwin, - U.S. - (-).
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regulation. This symposium is concerned with these new remedies and
rights and how they affect the practice of land use law and the develop-
ment and administration of ordinances in Illinois and nationally.
A. Symposium Summary
Professor A. Dan Tarlock of Chicago-Kent College of Law de-
scribes the "taking issue. '" 8 Tarlock says that there is "no law of what
constitutes a taking. The U.S. Supreme Court has been unable to...
develop a set formula ...for distinguishing between good and bad
regulations. . . ." Tarlock describes the harm prevention/arbitration
approaches, the utility test and the Illinois balancing test.
Professor Sheldon Nahmod, also of Chicago-Kent and a national
expert on new rights created under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, describes the new
injunctive relief, the damage liability and other remedies available
when constitutional or federal law is violated by a local regulation. 9
The absence of local government and local official immunity will cause
some new caution in formerly fearless zoners, he suggests. Where land
use is protected by free speech, "taking", substantive due process and
other safeguards, quick response to voter anti-development moods may
now be tempered by the spectre of liability.
Professor Daniel Mandelker of Washington University, prolific
author and recognized land use expert, describes the complexities of
the free speech protections and the intricacies of Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego io as the protection is applied. 1 Adult entertainment
and other action may come within this constitutional ambit.
Mandelker suggests a local "free speech audit" of regulations and some
change in Illinois and other state practice. According to Mandelker,
local "line drawing" might have to be more cautious in the future.
Professor Stuart Deutsch of Chicago-Kent raises the spectre of
treble damages when a community acts in a monopolistic manner such
as zoning out a new shopping area to protect an existing one.12 Anti-
trust law is likely to be applied seriously to local government zoning
according to Deutsch and developer/owners are likely to raise the de-
fense or offense more frequently.
7. Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Metromedia v. City of San
Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (-); Jewish Reconstruction Synagogue v. Village of Roslyn Harbor, 38
N.Y.2d 283, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976).
8. Infira at 23.
9. Infra at 39.
10. Metromedia, Inc., v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
I!. Infra at 51.
12. Infra at 63.
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Don Glickman, a Chicago attorney discusses the keys to present-
ing a case in the new environment of extended liability. 13 Glickman
contrasts present Illinois review criteria, heavily weighted to "dimuni-
tion of value", with emerging criteria used in other courts. These new
criteria are future oriented and dependent on comprehensive plans and
planning.
Finally, Marlin Smith, one of the national "deans" of land use
law, applies the new law to the Illinois situation. ' 4 Examining Illinois'
detailed court review of local zoning, and decisions seemingly based on
federal constitutional grounds, Smith suggests that courts are opening
the door to expanded "taking" claims and resulting damages as well as
section 1983 damages.
B. The Problem in Illinois and States that Follow Similar Rules
Marlin Smith's article is clearly the most foreboding. It suggests
the need to carefully analyze Illinois' and other states' approach to zon-
ing review-an approach which closely analyzes local decisions and
often finds them to be unconstitutional.
Not all states follow the Illinois approach. Most are somewhere
on a loose continuum between full review and almost no review and
consider zoning a legislative act accorded a strong presumption of va-
lidity. Local decisions to rezone, fail to rezone, or deny a special use
are only overturned if clearly unconstitutional or beyond well-deline-
ated statutory boundaries. California is one such state. New York os-
cillates.' 5 Some jurisdictions consider some zoning decisions quasi-
judicial in nature and follow the Fasano 16 rule, which requires strong
procedural guarantees. These jurisdictions categorized land use deci-
sions as if they were adjudicatory rather than legislative in nature.
Illinois pays homage to the legislative presumption of validity but
then goes on to full judicial review. According to commentators, the
court measures the "inefficient" nature of the zoning and applies a
Lochner v. New York 17 constitutional analysis.' 8 In LaSalle National
Bank v. County of Cook, 19 the seminal Illinois zoning case, the court
points to a "constitutional question" involving construction of the con-
13. Infra at 89.
14. Infra at 93.
15. See R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, LAND-USE CONTROLS, 76 (1981).
16. Fasano v. Board of Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973). Colorado, Kansas, Wash-
ington, Idaho, Montana and the District of Columbia also follow the rule.
17. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
18. See R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, LAND-USE CONTROLS, 75 (1981).
19. 12 111. 2d 40, 145 N.E.2d 65 (1957).
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stitution and a complaint that challenges the zoning on a "due pro-
cess", "taking" and "equal protection" argument.20 The LaSalle
National Bank criteria seem to involve the application of constitutional
principles to land use decisions. Whether these are federal or state con-
stitutional rights seems never to have been determined by Illinois
courts, however. Yet even then the U.S. Supreme Court may have
some inclination to look at the "rational basis" of an ordinance. 2
This potential for federal unconstitutionality is Marlin Smith's
great concern in this symposium and is the subject of this article. Con-
sidering the dearth of unique state constitutional law until recently in
the land use area, the statements in LaSalle National Bank seem to
involve construction of the federal constitution.
Curing the procedural errors of local governments is easy. It re-
quires nothing but a clear listing of those processes which an ordinance,
an appeal or other interpretation and application must utilize for fair
hearings, notice, bias and other standards. Meeting the Fasano quasi-
judicial standards is also relatively straight forward. But if Illinois mu-
nicipalities are to clean up their zoning process by improving the sub-
stantive basis on which zoning decisions are made they will need a
clear set of Miranda guidelines to avoid the section 1983 and the taking
liability discussed in this symposium. What are new problems with
statutory violations and with unconstitutional activities? What is the
Illinois substantive standard? What, if any, guidance do communities
have in applying a substantive standard in a constitutional manner and
what guidance could they be provided?
II. NEW STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS THAT
ZONING FACES
As Sheldon Nahmod discusses in more detail in this symposium,
section 1983 liability of municipal governments and officers involves
examining what practices yield liability, what persons and governments
are liable, what standards are applied to the action, and what remedies
are available.
To be a prohibited practice under section 1983, there must be more
than an isolated instance; an official custom, policy or usage is re-
20. Id. at 42, 145 N.E.2d at 67. But see Daily, J. (dissenting) "factual determinations [of a
reasonable or unreasonable zoning restraint] do not involve fairly debateable constitutional ques-
tions." Id at 49, 145 N.E.2d at 70.
21. City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, 455 U.S. 283, 294 (1982). Id at 297 (opinion of
White, J.) and Id. at 302-04 (opinion of Powell, J.).
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quired.22 Respondeat superior is not applicable. 23 Violation of any
federal law may also serve as a basis for an action except where the
federal law provides its own comprehensive remedial devices. 24 For
example, zoning in violation of some federal wetlands protection policy
or zoning in violation of equal housing rights could yield liability.
Further, any constitutional violation, including violation of equal
protection, due process, or free speech, may provide the substantive ba-
sis for a section 1983 action and other rights. For example, improper
restriction of fast food franchises but not of restaurants, or an over-
ambitious dimunition in property value from a restrictive ordinance, or
a strict sign ordinance could result in section 1983 liability.
As to the issue of what persons and governments are liable under
section 1983, the Eleventh Amendment does not provide immunity for
municipalities and their officers25 although municipalities cannot be li-
able for punitive damages. 26 While certain absolute and qualified im-
munities exist for actions taken by judges, legislators and local
legislative bodies, 27 the municipality is liable.28 However, quasi-judi-
cial actors may be immune. This is significant in zoning actions be-
cause boards and commissions frequently have important roles 29 and
jurisdictions which apply the Fasano approach call many zoning mat-
ters judicial in nature. Still, it is unclear whether local zoning appeals
boards are such quasi-judicial actors.
30
In 1982 the Supreme Court established an objective standard for
determining what constitutes official acts. "[Glovernment officials [and
necessarily the government itself] performing discretionary functions
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ' 31 But what
"clearly established constitutional rights" are in a zoning situation is
not at all clear. Zoning decisions which draw boundaries, examine
conflicting uses, or look at hardship simply do not provide guidance
and Miranda warnings cannot readily be fashioned. However, officials
22. Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-92 (1978).
23. Id. at 693-94.
24. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 19-21 (1981).
25. Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.54 (1978); Owen v. City of Inde-
pendence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
26. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 258-71 (1981).
27. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980).
28. Hernandez v. City of LaFayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1196 (5th Cir. 1981).
29. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508-17 (1978).
30. See Gear v. City of Des Moines, 514 F. Supp. 1218 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
31. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
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in non-discretionary roles, performing ministerial duties may be liable,
and a standard of negligence may suffice for that liability.
32
Finally, both damages and injunctive remedies are available under
section 1983 and administrative and judicial remedies need not be ex-
hausted prior to bringing a section 1983 action. 33 Also, as a prospective
remedy against threatened enforcement of a municipal ordinance and
used against prosecutors and judges, a section 1983 action may lie. 34 In
some situations, punitive damages may be permitted.
Constitutional partial or full taking problems are inherent in zon-
ing. When a community regulates it generally takes some development
value away from the property. When it overregulates it takes away too
much development value. Case law has not yet fully recognized that a
community may be forced to buy land where partial taking or over-
regulation has occurred. Generally, the courts merely void the offend-
ing statute. But this remedy has not been helpful to curb
unconstitutional practices. In the near future courts may change that
approach and award damages.
Two cases arising in California, and resolved by the U.S. Supreme
Court, come so close to awarding damages that a regulating commu-
nity should fear unconstitutional taking for the damage reason alone.
In one of the cases, San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego ,35
a divided court awarded no damages but held the state decision was
not final. Four Justices (Brennan, Stewart, Marshall and Powell) found
that a taking had occurred and that damages were available under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Rehnquist, concurring,
also found damages available but agreed with the majority that the
state decision was not final. 36
Thus, the stage is set in the appropriate case for damages to be
awarded in an unconstitutional overregulation. 37 Such damages might
equally be applied in a free speech situation, in overcontrol of a reli-
gious institution or in strict limitations on multi-family or group hous-
ing. There could be permanent damages where the government
inversely condemns the property and becomes the owner. Or damages
might be permanent partial, in which the difference between the before
and the after value is awarded the landowner, or interim partial, where
32. Parratt v. Taylor, 101 S. Ct. 1908 (1981).
33. Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
34. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980).
35. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
36. Id. at 633-36.
37. See Arastra Limited Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal., 1975),
vacated, 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal., 1976).
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damages are awarded for the loss in value from the time the ordinance
was enacted to the time the ordinance was found invalid. A govern-
ment may, or ominously, may not be given the option of abandoning
the regulation to mitigate damages. At present, most state courts reject
interim and permanent damages and have done so unequivocally in
most cases.
38
Where a local government combines with others or conspires to
protect a monopoly or restrain trade,39 recent cases have held that the
government may be held liable for damages including treble dam-
ages.40 As examples, such a situation may occur when a restaurant is
protected from competition by national franchises, or when a down-
town business area works with the government to restrict a new shop-
ping center on the outskirts of town. Current decisions suggest that a
municipality could impose anti-competitive zoning or other restraints
on trade through land use controls and still be protected by the Elev-
enth Amendment when the legislature contemplated the kind of action
by a subordinate government, the acts were part of a comprehensive
regulatory system, the acts were clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed as state policy, and the policy was "actively supervised by the
State. . . . "4 State grants of home rule do not insulate local govern-
ment.42 Nor is a state law sufficient which "permitted" local zoning.
43
III. How CAN ILLINOIS AND SIMILAR STATES AVOID LIABILITY?
In this realm of new constitutional obligations and new rights to
damages on the part of developer/owners it becomes important to de-
termine if there are Illinois guidelines to assist local governments in
conforming their zoning and rezoning actions to settled state law.
Illinois zoning law is administered by cities and villages, townships
and counties. 44 The usual panoply of variances, special uses, amend-
ments, subdivision controls are utilized to control height, lot size, use,
38. But see Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Duggan, 95 111. 2d 516, 449 N.E.2d 69 (1983).
39. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1983), Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13, 14-21,
22-27 (1983).
40. City of LaFayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
41. Id. at 408-17 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
42. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
43. Mason City Center Associates v. City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737, 743 (N.D. Iowa
1979).
44. See R. SMITH, C. FORREST & E. FREUND, A GUIDE TO MUNICIPAL ZONING ADMINIS-
TRATION (1972) for a complete description of the municipal system. A similar guide has been
published for County Zoning. See also -. COPE, ZONING HANDBOOK FOR MUNICIPAL OFFI-
CIALS WITH SUGGESTED FORMS (1983). For Illinois zoning statutes see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24,
§§ 11-13-4--l-13-20, (Cities and Villages); ch. 34, §§ 3151-3162 (Counties); ch. 139, §§ 301-317
(Townships) (1983).
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density and other aspects of land development. A zoning administrator
leads local efforts and a board of appeals, zoning amendment agency,
plan commission and the local legislative body perform customary
functions.
Review of zoning actions may occur at a number of points and by
different parties. A developer/owner may appeal a zoning decision, a
neighbor or neighborhood group may protest action, and a nearby mu-
nicipality may complain in some situations. 45 These complaints could
allege that an ordinance is too strict or too lenient and should be
amended,4 6 or that a special use or variation should issue or should not
have been issued. Often, too, a party complains that a condition placed
upon a permit is too strict or too lenient. The complaining party con-
tests a substantive fault in the local activity asserting that the activity is
not within statutory or case law guidelines, or that it is not within con-
stitutional prerogatives. Also, a complainant may charge that activity
is procedurally faulty because of improper notice hearing.
The burden of proof is always on the party attacking a zoning or-
dinance.4 7 Local legislative actions have a presumption of validity,
48
but like all presumptions, this is rebuttable49 and can be overcome by
clear and convincing evidence. The ordinance or action must be found
to have "no substantial relationship to public health, safety and wel-
fare" in order for it to be held invalid.50 However, a "substantial rela-
tionship" to public health, safety and welfare was required in
LaGrange State Bank v. County of Cook.51 Generally, if the evidence is
"at best, debateable" or there are "legitimate differences" of expert
opinion, the action is valid.
5 2
Often the court states that the zoning must be "arbitrary and un-
reasonable" 53 and more than a preponderance of evidence is required
45. Forestview Homeowners Ass'n v. County of Cook, 18 I11. App. 3d 230, 237, 309 N.E.2d
763, 768 (1974).
46. "The validity of amendatory zoning ordinances is tested by the same rules applicable in
• ..original zoning ordinances." LaSalle National Bank v. City of Chicago, 5 I11. 2d 344, 351,
125 N.E.2d 609, 613 (1955).
47. LaSalle National Bank v. City of Chicago, 5 111. 2d 344, 350, 125 N.E.2d 609, 613 (1955).
48. Forestview Homeowners Ass'n v. County of Cook, 18 I11. App. 3d 230, 241, 309 N.E.2d
763, 771 (1974). Exchange National Bank v. County of Cook, 25 111. 2d 434, 439-40, 185 N.E.2d
250, 253 (1962).
49. Forestview, supra at 242-243, 309 N.E.2d at 772-73.
50. Tomasek v. City of Des Plaines, 64 111. 2d 172, 180, 354 N.E.2d 899, 903 (1976); Duggan
v. County of Cook, 60 I11. 2d 107, I11, 324 N.E.2d 406, 409 (1975).
51. 75 I11. 2d 301, 310, 388 N.E.2d 388, 392 (1979).
52. American National Bank v. Village of Oak Lawn, 81 111. App. 3d 952, 961, 401 N.E.2d
963, 969 (1979).
53. Duggan v. County of Cook, 60 Ill. 2d 107, 111, 324 N.E.2d 406, 408 (1975).
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for such proof.54 In Drogos v. City of Bensenville, the court suggested
that a party must prove that a proposed use is reasonable by "clear and
convincing" evidence in order for the court to proceed beyond a find-
ing of invalidity to compel a new use.
55
At various times the courts have said that invalidity occurs when
there is an "invasion of private constitutional rights without reasonable
justification" and a zoning ordinance cannot be amended except for the
public, rather than private good.5 6 Review of the trial court holding is
under the "manifest weight of evidence" test.
57
Remedial response to such complaints in Illinois includes injunc-
tive relief, declaratory judgment, or substitution of a valid restriction
for the invalid (judicial rezoning or definitive relief).5 8 Illinois courts
are activists, routinely reviewing lower court and local zoning deci-
sions.5 9 Generally, they conduct a cost/benefit analysis of zoning ac-
tions and invalidate those that they call inefficient.60 It is, of course,
this activism, grounded as it is on constitutional and sometimes statu-
tory objections, that presents the problem. These very objections ex-
pose municipalities to grave potential for heavy damages. Unless the
courts also provide sound guidance as to what is and what is not consti-
tutional or statutory adherence the zoning authorities and even local
personnel are dangerously exposed.
The basic constitutional standards applied in Illinois revolve
around the LaSalle National Bank criteria. These criteria can be di-
vided into the following categories:
A. The Nearby Use Test
B. The Nearby Zoning Test
C. Conformance with Planning Test
D. The Suitability Test
E. The Hardship/Public Benefit Test
F. The Need for the Use Test
G. The Damage to the Area Test
H. Miscellaneous Tests--General Public Welfare, Boundary Lines
and Acquisition with Knowledge.
54. Id. at 1!1, 324 N.E.2d at 408.
55. Drogos v. Village of Bensenville, 100 Il1. App. 3d 48, 56, 426 N.E.2d 1276, 1283 (1981).
56. Garner v. City of Carmi, 28 Ill. 2d 560, 564, 192 N.E.2d 816, 819 (1963).
57. Pioneer Bank v. County of Cook, 71 111. 2d 510, 516-17, 377 N.E.2d 21. 24 (1978).
58. See Drogos v. Village of Bensenville, 100 11. App. 3d 48, 426 N.E.2d 1276 (1981), for a
standard for definitive relief as "clear and convincing evidence that the proposed use is reason-
able" even though the original zoning is found invalid. Id. at 56, 426 N.E.2d at 1283.
59. See Williams, Treatise on Land Planning Law, Volume 1, pp. 143-48 for a complete
description of the Illinois system.
60. R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, LAND-USE CONTROLS 75 (1981).
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According to the courts "no one factor is controlling" 6 1 and the effect of
each factor is considered. In some cases the standards seem to be used
to directly test the validity of the ordinance. In others, the standards
weaken the presumption of validity.
For each of these criterion it is important to consider the basis or
rationale for the test, the cases which apply the test and whether or not
the test can provide meaningful guidance to a community or devel-
oper/owner wishing to avoid constitutional issues. One commentator
has said the test has a "beguiling simplicity which almost begs for facts
to be thrown into the. . . hopper so that the appropriate judicial deter-
mination can be sifted out."
'62
A. The Nearby Use Test
This criterion examines whether or not the uses permitted under
the zoning, planned or presently in operations, are consistent with
nearby uses. Obviously, in a case where the surrounding six blocks are
filled with single family residences and the zoned site is not differenti-
ated from the other areas, the nearby use test insures that zoning and
rezoning is consistent, recognizes the reliance of nearby property own-
ers and is not influenced by improper factors. However, the criterion is
difficult to apply when the uses are mixed. For example, a few high
rise apartment houses may be invading an urban two flat neighborhood
or convenience stores may be slowly sprouting along a more or less
rural or small town road. Likewise, the criterion is not well suited to
situations where the character of the neighborhood is changing. Yet
again, the nearby use test does not account for the natural situation
where incompatible uses tend to leak over boundaries and into other
areas.
While the courts have a difficult time with this test since there are
no hard and fast rules for handling these three complex situations,
many courts have considered nearby use as a criterion of paramount
importance. 63 However, recognizing the difficulties with the test in
some situations, other courts have modified the test. In Parkway Bank
& Trust Co. v. City of Chicago, the court noted that the test was not
61. LaSalle National Bank v. County of Cook, 12 111. 2d 40, 47, 145 N.E.2d 65, 69 (1957).
62. COPE, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN ILLINOIS, Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Education,
Illinois Land Use Law 1978, 1980 Supp.
63. LaGrange State Bank v. County of Cook, 75 Ill. 2d 301, 309-10, 388 N.E.2d 388, 392
(1979); Standard State Bank v. Village of Oak Lawn, 29 111. 2d 465, 470-71, 194 N.E.2d 201, 204
(1963); Kellett v. County of DuPage, 89 Ill. App. 2d 437, 231 N.E.2d 706, 709 (1967).
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determinative when the area was a "patchwork" of different uses.64
Another case suggests that the combination of nearby residential uses
and improvement of the subject property as a residential use is determi-
native. 65 And Kellett v. County of DuPage66 limits the test even more.
What can be gleaned from these cases by those concerned with the
constitutional consequences of particular zoning actions? Perhaps,
patchwork areas do not benefit from the test to restrict further uses.
The overall character of the area may be more important than the
microenvironment, the adjoining uses. Expectations of nearby prop-
erty owners are important, but when conditions change and new devel-
opment appears, those expectations have to change as well. The test
has not been applied to suggest a status quo and probably should not
be.
B. The Nearby Zoning Test
Nearby zoning is a LaSalle criterion that looks to consistency in
community planning and is the obverse of spot zoning. Not only
should uses be consistent but zoning itself must be consistent. To lay
down an industrial special use in the midst of multi-family residences
seems so inconsistent that it suggests hanky-panky at worst and igno-
rance at best. Nearby zoning is also a way of finding a comprehensive
plan when none exists. Thus, some say the plan is in the "bosom" of
the zoning ordinance found in the "planning" rather than plan.
67
Yet, there are significant problems with the nearby zoning test.
The area may be riddled with nonconforming uses or structures, a zon-
ing boundary may be nearby, or the nearby zoning may be wrong.68
Despite these problems, the court in Kellett v. County of DuPage held
that "existing uses and zoning classifications of nearby property are of
paramount importance," 69 and found that even a nonconforming use of
the subject property or adjoining property does not alter the residential
64. Parkway Bank v. City of Chicago, 107 I11. App. 3d 252, 255, 437 N.E.2d 753, 756 (1982).
65. LaSalle National Bank v. County of Cook, 94 111. App. 3d 341, 349-50, 418 N.E.2d 932,
937 (1981).
66. Kellett v. County of DuPage, 89 Ill. App. 2d 437, 443-44, 231 N.E.2d 706, 709 (1967).
There, a nearby use was a tavern and a heavily traveled thoroughfare, yet the court gave strong
weight to the surrounding area being predominantly residential.
67. See Kozesnik v. Township of Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 131 A.2d 1 (1957).
68. Uses not normally subject to zoning such as public utilities, highways and railroads may
seriously affect land uses. Zoning may be imposed on a wholly undeveloped area and be unlikely
to survive the first request for an amendment.
69. Kellett v. County of DuPage, 89 111. App. 2d 437, 443, 231 N.E.2d 706, 709 (1967); Jacob-
son v. City of Evanston, 10 111. 2d 61, 70, 139 N.E.2d 205, 209 (1956).
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character of the neighborhood. In Drogos v. City ofBensenville70 a pol-
icy of general buffer areas or main highway buffers was negated by
nearby zoning different from that of the affected property. Reliance by
owners on nearby zoning was considered especially important in
Vedevell v. City of Northlake7' and Oak Park National Bank v. City of
Chicago .72 In Bennett v. City of Chicago73 the integrity of the R-2 zon-
ing and the surrounding area similarly zoned overrode any objections.
The courts have described yet another factor of the test, where whether
the nearby uses were "uniform and established" was important.
74
To those concerned with guidelines on zoning, the nearby zoning
test is helpful in the simple case, where a "spot" of different zoning is
set down in the midst of contradictory zoning. Also, the courts provide
some guidance in dealing with buffer areas and public roads and have
found that even adjacent nonconforming uses may not offset zoning in
the neighborhood. No mathematical formula emerges, but the test
seems as if it ought to be made more analogous to an indicia of com-
prehensive planning.
C Conformance with Planning Test
A comprehensive plan is often considered the local land use con-
stitution against which zoning validity can be tested. 75 California and a
number of other states require such a plan76 and some states even limit
the manner and frequency in which the plan can be altered to preserve
permanence and reliability.77 In some states it is the major document
and the factual basis against which zoning is routinely tested. 78 A plan
can be a map delineating present and future preferred uses, a compen-
dium of policies to help determine what regulations to apply or the sum
total of all regulations.
Use of a comprehensive plan has a number of advantages. Citi-
zens and developers as well as the community can rely upon them in
70. 100 Ill. App. 3d 48, 56, 426 N.E.2d 1276, 1283 (1981).
71. 22 11. 2d 611, 614, 177 N.E.2d 124, 125-26 (1961).
72. 10 I11. App. 3d 258, 271, 294 N.E.2d 42, 50 (1973).
73. 24 I11. 2d 270, 274, 181 N.E.2d 96, 98 (1962).
74. LaGrange State Bank v. County of Cook, 75 Ill. 2d 301, 309-10, 388 N.E.2d 388, 391-92
(1979); Standard State Bank v. Village of Oak Lawn, 29 111. 2d 465, 470-71, 194 N.E.2d 201, 204
(1963); Jacobson v. City of Evanston, 10 I11. 2d 61, 70, 139 N.E.2d 205, 209 (1956).
75. See Haar, The Master Plan. An Impermanent Constitution, 20 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
353 (1953).
76. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65301, 65302 (West 1983), FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.190
(West 1980).
77. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65300.5 (West 1983).
78. Green v. Hayward, 275 Or. 693, 552 P.2d 815 (1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30,
§ 4962(1)(A) (1964).
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making investment decisions. The community can focus its attention
on major issues instead of relatively minor step-by-step changes. Com-
prehensive plans are the result of sound planning and generally sound
studies-though there are still myriad examples of cookie cutter plans
adopted under HUD 701 funding that are hardly customized to a com-
munity's needs.
79
Illinois does not require such a plan.8 ° But if one exists it can be
utilized to support zoning action or to negate such action if there is a
conflict. DeMarie v. City of Lake Forest81 exemplifies a court's intricate
analysis of a plan, an analysis not frequently done by Illinois courts.
Yet, a number of Illinois cases have relied upon the comprehensive
plan. In Forestview Homeowner's Assoc. v. County of Cook the court
found the plan "relevant" to determine if the zoning ordinance is in
harmony with the orderly utilization of property. 82 The lack of a com-
prehensive plan does not invalidate an ordinance but substantially
weakens the well-known presumption of validity.
8 3
In recent years the cases have stressed the comprehensive plan
more than they have in the past. The plan seems a sound basis on
which to test a zoning action since it offers a more objective means to
examine the consistency of a zoning action. Of course, where a plan is
a mass of general goals in writing, overlay maps with little specificity,
the plan is of little more help than other vague tests.
D. The Suitability Test
A piece of land is suitable for a zoned purpose where it can be
developed for that purpose. Land which has lain idle and undeveloped
may in fact illustrate improper zoning of the area. This test looks at
how long the land has not been used, what efforts have been made to
use the land in the zoned manner and the overall suitability of the land
for the zoned purpose. LaSalle National Bank84 suggests that this re-
view must be made in light of the pace and tempo of land development
in the immediate area. There needs to have been some development in
79. Section 701 is found at 40 U.S.C. 461(c) (1982).
80. Plans are authorized, however. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, § 3151 (1983). See also Fifteen
Fifty North State Building Corp. v. City of Chicago, 15 I11. 2d 408, 155 N.E.2d 97 (1959).
81. 417 N.E.2d 641, 93 Ill. App. 3d 357 (1981).
82. Forestview Homeowners Ass'n v. County of Cook, 18 111. App. 3d 230, 240-41, 309
N.E.2d 763, 771 (1974).
83. Id. at 243, 209 N.E.2d at 773. See also Fifteen Fifty North State Building Corp. v. City
of Chicago, 15 Ill. 2d 408, 155 N.E.2d 97, 102-03 (1959).
84. LaSalle National Bank v. County of Cook, 12 111. 2d 40, 145 N.E.2d 65, 69 (1957).
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the area and that development should have been in conformance with
the zoning for that location.
In Duggan v. County of Cook 85 a one year listing without sale was
enough to overrule a refusal to rezone; however, other factors such as
the land being in a flood plain and the absence of sewer and water
connections were important as well. Thus, factors such as how the land
was marketed and listed and the asking price need to be accounted for
if true market suitability is to be tested in an objective fashion. For
example, in LaGrange State Bank v. County of Cook 86 and American
National Bank v. Village of Oak Lawn 87 the owner did not even at-
tempt to sell the land for the zoned purpose. And in Kellett v. County of
DuPage88 slow development was explained by lack of sewer or water.
Failure of the land to be developed can be an important constitu-
tional marker and the cases suggest that this must be established by
strong marketing, a property fully capable of development and efforts
to use the land in the zoned manner. Land which is not sewered due to
a municipal policy to restrict growth ought not be burdened with fur-
ther bias in a rezoning case because of that policy.
E The Hardshp/Public Benefit Test
Balancing hardship against public benefit has long been consid-
ered in the armory of tests for appropriate land use controls used on the
national level.89 Its reception and use in Illinois have not been that
much different from that known to law students for years.
Of course, most zoning depresses market value. The question is
how much is allowable and for what purposes is the value depressed.
Value can be depressed up to 100 percent if the public benefit is signifi-
cant. 90 But public benefit can be of two varieties and scholars and
courts have long jousted over how much of which is acceptable. Air
pollution, excessive traffic, subsidence due to mining, and dangers from
an open gravel pit illustrate a public harm which can be reduced. Or, a
public benefit may be enhanced as when more open space or a park are
established. Generally, the alleviation of a harm (one kind of benefit)
85. 60 111. 2d 107, 113, 324 N.E.2d 406, 409-10 (1975).
86. 75 Ill. 2d 301, 310, 388 N.E.2d 388, 392 (1979).
87. 81 111. App. 3d 952, 960, 401 N.E.2d 963, 968 (1979).
88. 89 111. App. 2d 437, 444-45, 231 N.E.2d 706, 710 (1967). That the county did not provide
sewer and water should perhaps permit a change in use to a use which was not dependent on such
services to compensate for this "growth" control.
89. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
90. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
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has been accepted, but the provision of a benefit has been more rigor-
ously examined. 9'
LaSalle National Bank specifically adopts this test and suggests a
balancing between relative gain to the public and the hardship to the
property owner.92 In another LaSalle National Bank case a 50 percent
loss in value invalidated the zoning.93 Kellett v. County of DuPage said
that while land is substantially more valuable for the new use pro-
posed, this is usually the case and that fact alone does not invalidate an
existing zoning ordinance. 94 A better view was asserted in DeMarie v.
City of Lake Forest, "the less substantial the relationship of the zoning
to the public health, safety, comfort, morals and welfare, the more
likely the zoning is invalid and the more significance the dimintion[sic]
in value is given as one of the criteria of invalidity.
' 95
The hardship test is helpful and the concepts of balancing, hard-
ship, and public benefit have been developed not only in Illinois courts
but in other courts as well. Further, many law reviews have analyzed
this criterion.96 As usual, however, the test is not considered determi-
native and Illinois has not clearly distinguished public benefit from al-
leviation of a hardship. Still, zoning officials can build a record to
comport with Illinois holdings and with the standards that have
emerged in other decisions. It is this record which will help reduce the
potential for constitutional litigation.
F The Need Test
The need test is of relatively minor importance.97 With this crite-
rion, the court asks how much the community needs the proposed land
use. Community need for the use was helpful in DeMarie v. City of
Lake Forest98 and is important in the case of certain public services
such as gas stations. 99 However, the test has yet to be seriously consid-
91. See Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls.: An Economic & Legal Analysis, 86 Yale L.J.
385 (1977) and Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants Nuisance Rules and Fines as Land Use
Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973).
92. LaSalle National Bank v. County of Cook, 12 Ill. 2d 40, 47, 145 N.E.2d 65, 69 (1957).
93. LaSalle National Bank v. City of Chicago, 5 Ill. 2d 344, 354, 125 N.E.2d 609, 614 (1955).
94. Kellett v. County of DuPage, 89 111. App. 2d 437, 444, 231 N.E.2d 706, 709 (1967).
95. DeMarie v. City of Lake Forest, 93 Ill. App. 3d 357, 363, 417 N.E.2d 641, 645 (1981).
96. See, e.g., Costonis, Fair Compensation and the Accomodation Power, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
1021 (1975); Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 650
(1958); and F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES, J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973).
97. Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Village of Richton Park, 19 111. 2d 370, 376, 167 N.E.2d 406, 410
(1960); Pioneer Bank v. County of McHenry, 41 Il. 2d 77, 85, 241 N.E.2d 454, 459 (1968); Hoff-
man v. City of Waukegan, 51 111. App. 2d 241, 245, 201 N.E.2d 177, 179-80 (1964).
98. 93 I11. App. 3d 357, 364-65, 417 N.E.2d 641, 647 (1981).
99. Drogos v. Village of Bensenville, 100 Ill. App. 3d 48, 54, 426 N.E.2d 1276, 1281 (1981).
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ered in zoning issues involving group housing, half-way houses, adult
entertainment, arcades or fast food franchises.
G. The Damage to the Area Test
New zoning, generally to a less restrictive use, may damage the
area by reducing property values because of increased noise, traffic and
pollution. The damage to the area test asks whether that damage is
significant enough to void the proposed zoning change. Light levels in
a convenience store helped void an ordinance in Kellett v. County of
DuPage.'°° LaSalle National Bank looked at the fact that value was
not appreciably decreased nearby by the proposed use.'10 In American
National Bank v. Village of Oak Lawn the court noted the "prejudice"
to future development of single family homes if condominiums were
allowed. 0 2 However, in Drogos v. Village of Bensenville the court dis-
counted the "domino" effect of spreading damage, 0 3 and the Tomasek
v. City of Des Plaines ruling was heavily influenced by the fact that a
proposed commercial use "would severely alter if not destroy the
predominantly residential quality of the neighborhood."'04 The im-
pacts on community services such as schools, roads and public utilities
including demands for new services that a community could not sustain
have been considered as well. 0 5
Sound planning suggests that damage is an important criterion.
Damage to an area can be assessed by the testimony of often competing
witnesses, but there is a court ability to ferret out the realistic from the
unrealistic evidence and to consider the damage that is acceptable to a
neighborhood.
H. Miscellaneous Tests
1. General Public Welfare
Though not strictly a LaSalle criteria the Illinois courts often ap-
ply a general public welfare test. Thus, Tomasek v. City of Des Plaines
upholds an ordinance if it has "any" substantial relationship to the
public health, safety, comfort, or welfare. 06 Forestview Homeowner's
100. 89 Ill. App. 2d 437, 445, 231 N.E.2d 706, 710 (1967).
101. 12 I11. 2d 40, 47, 145 N.E.2d 65, 69 (1957).
102. 81 111. App. 3d 952, 959, 401 N.E.2d 963, 967 (1979).
103. 100 I11. App. 3d 48, 55, 426 N.E.2d 1276, 1282 (1981).
104. 64 Ill. 2d 172, 181, 354 N.E.2d 899, 903 (1976).
105. Duggan v. County of Cook, 60 Ill. 2d 107, 114, 324 N.E.2d 406, 410 (1975), is more
skeptical calling impacts "not conclusive"; Forestview Homeowners Ass'n v. County of Cook, 18
Ill. App. 3d 230, 246, 309 N.E.2d 763 (1974).
106. Tomasek v. City of Des Plaines, 64 Ill. 2d 172, 179, 354 N.E.2d 899, 903 (1976). Duggan
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Assoc. v. County of Cook looks to a public benefit in a more exact
sense. 10 7 Rezoning which does not lessen or avoid congestion or reach
other statutory objectives is invalid-a novel and very flexible ap-
proach. Unfortunately, the test is surely too vague for any serious ap-
plication unless detailed studies show the lack of public benefit.
Very often equal protection arguments are raised here as well. In
Frost v. Village of Glen Ellyn 10 8 the Court expanded the Bolger v. Vil-
lage of Mt. Prospect 109 test to reject a distinction between drive-in and
enclosed restaurants. The Court required a "real difference" between
classes stating that the one form of restaurant was not significantly
more detrimental to the public health, safety, welfare or morals than
the other.
2. Boundary Lines
The boundary line issue is ubiquitous in zoning cases. There al-
ways are zoning boundaries and always will be because, as one court
said "zoning must begin and end somewhere". "10 That different zoning
areas abut "does not make a more restrictive classification unreasona-
ble".'" Boundaries need not be an important factor in review though
courts could if they wished apply sound planning principles and re-
quire buffers between zones where that was possible.
1 2
3. Acquisition with Knowledge
Unfortunately Illinois courts have used acquisition with knowl-
edge as a means to deny a plaintiff zoning rights, calling it a "factor to
be considered . . . especially where . . . the acquisition was relatively
recent to the time the zoning change was sought."' 13 Another court has
said that, "[d]iminution of value. . . is not alone a sufficient reason to
invalidate . . . . This is particularly true where plaintiffs purchased
v. County of Cook, 60 111. 2d 107, 111, 324 N.E.2d 406, 409 (1975), suggests that a change or an
ordinance must bear "no ... relationship" to be held invalid.
107. 18 Ill. App. 3d 230, 245-46, 309 N.E.2d 763, 774-75 (1974). Forestview called "A change
in zoning . . . justified . . . only because the public welfare requires it." Id at 247, 309 N.E.2d at
776.
108. 30 Il1. 2d 241, 195 N.E.2d 616 (1964).
109. 10 Ill. 2d 596, 141 N.E.2d 22 (1957).
110. Lapkus Builders v. City of Chicago, 30 111. 2d 304, 310, 196 N.E.2d 682, 686 (1964). See
Ward v. County of Cook, 68 Ill. App. 3d 563, 569-70, 386 N.E.2d 309, 315 (1979).
Il1. American National Bank v. Village of Oak Lawn, 81 111. App. 3d 952, 959, 401 N.E.2d
963, 967 (1979).
112. See DeMarie v. City of Lake Forest, 93 111. App. 3d 357, 364, 417 N.E.2d 641, 646 (1981),
for rejection of a buffer on a buffer.
113. Kellett v. County of DuPage, 89 II1. App. 2d 437, 444, 231 N.E.2d 706, 710 (1967). See
Bolger v. Village of Mt. Prospect, 10 I11. 2d 596, 602, 141 N.E.2d 22, 25 (1957).
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• . . with full knowledge of the zoning restrictions."' " 4 Again, the
DeMarie v. City of Lake Forest court distinguishes between purchase
with the hope of "securing rezoning, then a quick profitable resale" and
purchase for and development as a residence of the owner. " 5 DeMarie
properly distinguishes between personal use and speculative purchase.
However in a broader sense, it seems clear that no landowner should be
denied the right to contest an invalid zoning action merely because the
landowner bought knowing about the invalidity. The land, not the
owner, is the beneficiary of the zoning and in itself has rights that
under sound planning doctrine should supersede any defenses against
an owner. 116
IV. CONCLUSION
Illinois law and the LaSalle National Bank criteria present some
guideposts that allow municipal officials to avoid liability under section
1983, "taking" and other provisions. But these criteria are generally
too vague and without much case-acquired meaning to enable them to
be very helpful in even routine situations. A reading of all but a few
LaSalle National Bank criteria cases will support that proposition. If
all were as carefully decided as say, DeMarie, then there might be more
certainty. However, since most zoning actions involve difficult situa-
tions the guidance is limited. Landowners are uncertain of rights and
local governments are overexposed and will continue to be until change
occurs.
Another problem with the Illinois criteria is that the courts con-
sider no one factor controlling. 1 7 As a result, the observer cannot dis-
cover why a decision was made and how much of any factor is
important. Only informed guesses on zoning and rezoning legality can
emerge from such uncertainty. Yet with the section 1983 liability
looming and the "taking" potential expanding, municipal and develop-
ers' attorneys need more.
Illinois courts will need to clearly sidestep the federal constitu-
tional issues by building explicit state constitutional grounds or by bet-
ter defining the boundaries of constitutional action. The former seems
114. American National Bank v. Village of Oak Lawn, 81 Ill. App. 3d 952, 960, 401 N.E.2d
963, 968 (1979).
115. See DeMarie v. City of Lake Forest, 93 Ill. App. 3d 357, 363, 417 N.E.2d 641, 646 (1981).
116. E. BASSETr, ZONING 177 (1936). See Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon, 307
N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954).
117. "[Elach case must necessarily be decided on its own particular facts." First National
Bank v. County of Cook, 15 I11. 2d 26, 31, 153 N.E.2d 545, 548 (1958).
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risky at best since the federal rights can always* be superimposed on any
court decision. As to defining the boundaries of constitutional action,
the court should develop for each of the tests some indicia which must
be proved for the zoning action to be validated or invalidated. Some of
those indicia, as drawn from the cases and experience, follow.
For the nearby use test, one must define what the character of the
area is. Is it a block, a street front, or fifty acres, and does it depend
upon the impact of the use proposed or of other uses? How are non-
conforming uses such as public utilities handled? Such uses probably
should not detract from the area unless they predominate. What about
changing areas, how are they handled? Some analysis of the amount of
change over a few years would be helpful. And, of course, that change
must impact the proposed use. Is an urban changing area different
from a "wait and see" rural area where zoning is merely awaiting the
proper use proposal? How are patchwork areas handled? Should the
test be used at all in such areas? Perhaps expectations should not be
considered at all because they merely parallel other indicia. Will opin-
ion polls, character evidence, and expert planners assist in proving the
case?
Regarding the nearby zoning test, what is meant by nearby?
Could not the test be considered a consistency test to be measured by
looking at zoning, changes in zoning, special use permits, variations
and plans. Are boundaries to be tolerated or considered strongly?
What about earlier zoning changes, special uses, variances, noncon-
forming uses? How is nearby improper zoning to be handled? Do the
nearby uses need to be uniform?
When we turn to the conformance with planning test, we should
ask what comprehensive plan is to be analyzed. Are underlying debate
and studies to be considered by a court? Suppose the plan has been
changed recently to adopt to the new zoning, how will those changes
affect validity? Can conflict with the plan be explained by a faulty plan
or changed conditions? Is absence of a plan conclusive, weighty, or of
help in a decision at all? What elements are required in a plan?
The suitability test must deal with what length of time without
development is requisite to show that presently zoned purpose is inva-
lid. What activities must have been undertaken by the owner? What
defenses are available to the community? How are unique, variation
type lands handled?
In the hardship/public benefit test hardship to the owner can be
proved by loss in property value exceeding, say, thirty per cent. But is
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loss calculated from proposed use, or highest use in present zone limits?
Is non-speculative investment opportunity treated similarly to specula-
tive purchase of land based on zoning change? Public benefit can be
proved by reducing public harm (ending noise, pollution, traffic) or by
increasing a public benefit (opening space, parks, residences) or both.
What proof of harm is acceptable? What about mitigation through
performance criteria? Will the balance between harm and benefit be
determined by property value, use value or by other criteria weighed
mathematically against each other or weighed by other means? How is
alternative regulation handled?
In the need test, is need for the use one of the tests? How is need
calculated? By absence of the use, by public opinion, by travel time to
nearby similar use, or by real estate experts? Are regional needs, multi-
family housing, halfway houses, adult entertainment, hazardous waste
storage, also needs considered in this test? Why should the demand for
such a need settle on this property in this community?
And finally, the indicia for damage to the area test include what is
the area? How much is mitigation by the proposed user considered?
How is damage assessed? By property value change, by planner, ap-
praiser opinion, by analysis of similar conflicting uses, or by mere opin-
ion of neighbors? Is the damage calculated as the difference between
present use (which might be no use), highest use now available, or
highest use proper, and proposed use? Is that proposed use considered
as mitigated and buffered? How is the "domino" effect analyzed?
Illinois courts need to fully examine the criteria by which they
judge the constitutionality of zoning decisions and must revise and im-
prove that criteria to provide more guidance. These indicia, and the
courts' answers to them, should provide the appropriate guidance so
that local communities can attempt to avoid section 1983 liability and
the potential for an inadvertent taking.

